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Uncovering the asymmetric linkage between financial derivatives 
and firm value – the case of oil and gas exploration and 
production companies 
 
Abstract 
 
We investigate the role of derivatives in enhancing firm value of US oil and gas exploration 
and production companies over the period 1998-2009, using both cross-sectional and time-
series tests. Initially focusing on Tobin’s Q, we document a ‘hedging discount’ in periods of 
increasing oil and gas prices, while there is some evidence that hedging leads to an increase 
in firm value in periods of decreasing prices. In the companion time-series tests our core 
finding indicates that hedger portfolios underperform compared to non-hedger portfolios i.e. 
confirming a hedging discount. We extend these time series tests to provide a range of 
conditional analyses exploring the circumstances in which this discount manifests. Here we 
find that the hedging discount is specifically related to periods of elevating oil and gas prices, 
especially if the price is high.  
 
Key words: oil and gas, financial derivatives, hedging, firm value  
JEL Classification: G21, G32 
  
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
 
1.  Introduction 
Can corporate risk management via the use of financial derivatives enhance firm 
value? This basic question motivates our study as part of an important stream of the 
corporate finance literature. Studies that examine incentives for corporate hedging 
suggest that hedging can be a value-enhancing exercise since corporations hedge to 
minimize expected taxes, underinvestment costs and financial distress costs (Nance et 
al. 1993; Aretz and Bartram, 2010).1 Nevertheless, studies that investigate the direct 
relationship between hedging and firm value have uncovered conflicting results. 
Allayannis and Weston (2001) examine the relationship between foreign currency 
hedging and Tobin’s Q and concludes that hedging activities enhance firm value. The 
notion of a hedging premium is further supported by Carter et al. (2006) in a sample of 
US airlines. On the other hand, Jin and Jorion (2006) find that hedging does not seem to 
affect firm value in oil and gas producers and that it even seems to impact firm value 
negatively in gold mining companies (Jin and Jorion, 2007).2 Utilizing a large 
international sample, Bartram et al. (2011) also report that the impact of derivatives on 
firm value tends to be weak and inconsistent over time.   
While a number of factors could potentially explain the inconsistency across 
these empirical findings, it appears that the success of a hedge in monetary terms is 
largely dependent on Treasury forecasts and, once the hedging decision has been made, 
the behaviour of the underlying source of risk. For example, in the context of a 
resources producer that has revenue-based commodity price exposures, hedging is 
most (least) financially beneficial, at least in the short run, when commodity prices fall 
(increase). Indeed, the notion that firms should hedge more of their revenue-based 
exposures when price falls and hedge less when price increases is the central tenet of a 
body of literature that investigates the degree of selective hedging undertaken by 
corporations.3  
                                                        
1
 In particular, Smith and Stulz (1985) argue that firm hedging activities using derivatives could produce 
significant benefits in countries where companies have a convex tax schedule. Hedging reduces the volatility of 
taxable income which leads to a decrease in the expected tax liability, and these tax savings have a potential to 
enhance firm value. Hedging can also enhance shareholder value through the mitigation of financial distress 
costs which include bankruptcy, legal fees and court costs as it reduces the variance of cash flows — leading to 
a reduction in the probability that the firm will encounter financial distress (Smith and Stulz, 1985). In addition, 
firm managers use derivatives to minimize the difference between the availability of liquidity and the obligated 
payments caused by volatile cash flows (Mayers and Smith, 1982). As a result, underinvestment can be avoided 
by using hedging as it helps companies maintain sufficient internal funds for profitable investment opportunities 
(Stulz, 1985). Examples of other studies in this broader literature include Berkman et al. (2002), Nguyen and 
Faff (2002; 2003), Benson and Oliver (2004), Nguyen, Faff and Hodgson (2010) and Birt et al. (2013). 
2
 Recently, Talbot et al. (2013) test theoretical drivers of the oil price beta of oil industry stocks. While they find 
strongest statistical and economic support for market conditions-type variables, there is weaker support for the 
prediction that financial risk management reduces the exposure of oil stocks to crude oil price variation. 
3
 Selective hedging is a term coined by Stulz (1996) that describes the practice of managers varying their hedge 
ratios according to their forecasts of future price movements. 
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In this paper, we aim to reinvestigate the relationship between hedging and firm 
value in a sample of US oil and gas exploration and production companies — as is the 
focus in Jin and Jorion (2006) — but over a more contemporary sample period, 1998 to 
2009. Moreover, the novelty and key contribution of our study is that we pay particular 
attention to the key conditioning influences that affect the dynamics of the hedging-firm 
value relation.  
To better understand the impact of derivatives hedging on firm value, it is 
important to distinguish between two potential value sources: corporate cash flows and 
cost of capital. With regard to the impact of hedging on cash flows, hedging can 
potentially enhance firm value because it reduces the volatility of operating cash flows 
and, hence, a range of costs associated with highly volatile cash flows such as expected 
taxes, financial distress costs and underinvestment as discussed above. The conjecture 
that hedging should improve firm value is further supported by Gay et al. (2011), who 
report that hedging is associated with a lower cost of equity. They argue that the lower 
cost of equity primarily arises from a reduction in the market beta and the SML beta.  
While the impact of hedging on a firm’s expected cash flows and cost of capital is 
suggestive of a positive influence on firm value, the magnitude of such benefits is not so 
well understood.4 In addition, it is important to recognize that derivatives hedging is 
most likely to add value in the presence of downside risk. Stulz (1996), for example, 
suggests that diversified shareholders are not concerned about volatility in general, but 
are concerned if such volatility can increase the risk of financial distress. Guay and 
Kothari (2003) also make an important assumption in estimating the expected cash 
flow benefits from hedging: firms only hedge their downside risk. Gay et al. (2011) also 
contend that the reduction in the cost of equity for derivatives users is attributable to 
lower financial distress costs — a source of systematic risk that is priced in equity 
returns. Drawing these arguments together, while hedging can be a valuable exercise in 
the presence of downside risk, there is little reason to expect that hedging can add value 
in the opposite scenario, i.e. when the volatility of the underlying asset is on the upside.  
Specific to our sample of oil and gas exploration and production companies, a 
short hedge on future production is expected to have a positive value when oil and gas 
prices decline below the contracted price. Nevertheless, the ultimate impact of 
derivatives hedging on firm value does not only depend on price movements, but also 
on the nature of the derivatives instrument used. Specifically, futures and forwards 
provide symmetric payoffs while options have asymmetric payoffs — the extent of gains 
is not the same as the extent of losses. As a result, when oil and gas prices increase after 
the hedges are in place, a hedging program employing options is expected to have a less 
                                                        
4
 Extant evidence suggests that the cash flow benefit of hedging is economically small relative to firm size and 
operating cash flows. Guay and Kothari (2003) find that the median value addition as a result of a three standard 
deviation change in interest rate, exchange rate and commodity price is $31 million, of which $15 million comes 
from the derivative portfolio or the hedge outcome. Graham and Rogers (2002) report a median value addition 
of $9.8 million for firms that hedge in response to tax incentives.  
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severe impact on firm value than one that is comprised entirely of linear payoff 
contracts such as futures and/or forwards. We, therefore, hypothesize that hedging 
enhances firm value when oil and gas prices decline, irrespective of the derivatives 
instruments that the firm employs. On the other hand, when oil and gas prices increase, 
hedging is expected to be associated with a firm value discount. Further, the more 
prominent the linear payoff contracts are, the more severe the extent of discount is 
expected compared to the use of options.  
Oil and gas is the industry of choice for a number of reasons. First, the movement 
in oil and gas prices has a direct and immediate effect on the cash flow of oil and gas 
companies. Second, the strong homogeneity of the oil and gas industry provides a 
unique perspective from which to analyze the value of firms’ hedging activities. In 
particular, oil and gas producers, by the nature of their business, have inherent ex-ante 
exposures to oil and gas prices. More importantly, their exposure tends to be relatively 
more transparent and easy to identify compared to industrial firms. In addition, as 
pointed out by Jin and Jorion (2006), not only are exposures of multi-sector firms 
complex, but not all the exposures are fully hedgeable using financial derivatives.   
Third, hedging in the oil and gas industry can have significant impact on firm 
value because oil and gas reserves make up a significant portion of the total value of 
companies in this industry. This is a very important observation as Guay and Kothari 
(2003) argue that for a sample of cross sectional non-financial firms, the potential 
impact of derivatives hedging gains on overall cash flows is small at best, and 
derivatives use cannot be fully attributable to the hedging premium documented in the 
literature. Finally, our focus on a single industry mitigates many of the endogeneity 
concerns relating to the propensity to hedge by firms belonging to different industries. 
More reliable conclusions can be made in relation to the impact of derivatives on firm 
value as some of the firms choose to hedge while others do not, despite similar 
propensities to do so. 
Investigating the impact of derivatives hedging on firm value in the oil and gas 
industry is apt as the market value of oil/gas producers is more sensitive to commodity 
price hedging outcomes in comparison to other downstream industries that belong to 
the same supply chain (for example, users of oil and gas). The strength of our argument 
is based on the fact that oil/gas production is the core business of our sample firms and, 
accordingly, it is of paramount importance for these firms to maximize their sales 
revenue through a combination of market pricing and fixed price contracts. In other 
words, the market expects oil/gas producers to be more active and selective hedgers as 
hedged cash flows make up a substantial proportion of overall cash flows. The 
importance of oil/gas price hedging in the industry also means that oil/gas producing 
companies are expected to be more sophisticated hedgers and that their programs are 
perhaps more scrutinized by the market compared to, say, airline companies who are 
also active oil/gas hedgers. This is due to the fact that for airlines, hedging is of 
secondary importance to their core business.  
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
As is apparent from Figure 1, the price of oil and gas experienced unusually high 
volatility, partly due to the turmoil in financial markets caused by the global financial 
crisis. It can also be seen that compared to oil prices, gas prices experienced 
significantly more volatility during this period of interest. Hedging, by definition, adds 
value by reducing the volatility of the firm’s expected cash flows. As a result, the value of 
hedging activities is expected to be maximized during this volatile sampling period. We 
also choose to focus on a sample of US firms since, from the 1990s, they are required to 
disclose relatively detailed information regarding market risk and usage of derivatives 
in their financial statements.  
We investigate the role of derivatives in enhancing firm value of US oil and gas 
exploration and production companies over the period 1998-2009, using both cross-
sectional and time-series tests. Initially focusing on Tobin’s Q, we document a ‘hedging 
discount’ in periods of increasing oil and gas prices, while there is some evidence that 
hedging leads to an increase in firm value in periods of falling oil and gas prices. In our 
companion time-series tests, based on the Fama French three-factor model, our core 
finding indicates that hedger portfolios underperform compared to non-hedger 
portfolios. We extend these time series tests to provide a range of conditional analyses 
exploring the circumstances in which this discount manifests.  Here we find that the 
hedging discount is specifically related to periods of elevating oil and gas prices, 
especially if the price is high. Our findings, while intuitive in nature, have several 
important implications.   
First, they offer an alternative viewpoint about the motives behind corporate 
hedging. Hedging discounts previously documented have been linked to a managerial 
aversion motive in which hedging is the product of managers aiming to maximize their 
own utility. In our study, the hedging discount is more likely to be the result of a 
hedging policy over prolonged periods of increasing oil and gas prices during the 
sampling period. As a result, the negative impact on firm value from hedging is a 
manifestation of misplaced expectations of firms in relation to future movements of oil 
and gas prices, rather than managerial risk aversion. Our finding that hedging activities 
only result in a discount in an inflationary environment has an important implication 
for studies that investigate the relationship between firm value and hedging. Our results 
complement those of Mackay and Moeller (2007) that a discriminating risk 
management program can add value. Particularly, the market rewards (penalizes) firms 
that hedge when hedging adds (destroys) value.  
Second, our results also offer a plausible explanation for the conflicting empirical 
evidence on the hedging-firm value relation. The foreign exchange hedging premium 
documented by Allayannis and Weston (2001), for example, is primarily driven by the 
gains achieved during the periods when the US dollar depreciated. Such a hedging 
premium was absent in the period of US dollar appreciation. Similarly, the hedging 
premium documented by Carter et al. (2006) is somewhat expected as the airline 
industry is a major consumer of fuel and hedging is valuable when the fuel price 
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increases. Indeed, as reported by the authors, the result was primarily influenced by the 
positive hedging premium documented over the 2002 – 2003 period, during which high 
fuel price and volatilities were present.  
Along the same line of reasoning, the failure of Jin and Jorion (2006) to document 
any relationship between firm value and hedging might be due to the behavior of oil and 
gas prices during the sampling period, when hedging gains in the 1998 – 1999 period 
were offset by hedging losses during 2000 – 2001. Bartram et al. (2011) also concur 
that derivatives use is associated with significantly higher value during the economic 
downturn of 2001 – 2002 as opposed to other time periods. Taken together, it appears 
that the value of corporate hedging coming from a reduction in the cost of financial 
distress and underinvestment might not be as important as previously thought. While 
there is no doubt that corporate hedging can add value through these avenues, the low 
probability of financial distress and underinvestment for an average firm at a particular 
point in time means that the value of a hedging program is predominantly determined 
by ‘going concern’ considerations relating to the behavior of the underlying source of 
risk.  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The next section offers a brief 
literature review. Data and methodology are documented in Section 3. We discuss our 
results in Section 4 and Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Literature Review 
While existing studies examining the relationship between hedging and firm 
value provide mixed empirical evidence within the oil and gas industry, there is a 
general consensus that the stock returns of oil and gas producers are largely driven by 
commodity prices. Boyer and Fillion (2007), for example, empirically illustrate that the 
stock return of Canadian energy companies is positively related to appreciations in 
natural gas and crude oil prices. In a global study, Nandha and Faff (2008) further show 
that oil price rises have a negative impact on equity returns for all sectors except 
mining, and oil and gas industries. In light of their findings, they recommend that 
international portfolio investors consider hedging oil price risk.  Also, specific to an oil 
and gas sample (1992-94), Haushalter (2000) examines the relationship between 
hedging in US oil and gas producers and their financing policy, tax status, compensation 
policy, ownership structure and operating characteristics. The study shows that the 
extent of hedging is related to firms’ financing costs. In particular, the fraction of 
production that is hedged will increase for the firm that has high financial leverage and 
low financial flexibility. The study also finds a positive relation between hedging and a 
proxy for firms’ ability to hedge. 
Jorion (1990) examines foreign currency hedging activities in a sample of US 
multinational companies and finds that these firms’ foreign currency beta is close to 
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zero, which implies that currency hedging would not affect firm value. On the other 
hand, Gagnon et al. (1998) document that dynamic hedging strategies lead to risk 
reduction and utility gains by constructing currency portfolios. Rajgopal (1999) 
examines 38 US oil and gas companies and reports that oil and gas reserves (as a 
proportion of total assets) have a positive impact on the sensitivities of stock return to 
oil/gas price changes. Similarly, Jin and Jorion (2006) provide supporting results in a 
sample of 119 US oil and gas firms that there is no relationship between hedging and 
firm value, but that hedging plays an important role in reducing stock return sensitivity 
to changes in oil and gas prices.5 In contrast, the magnitude of oil and gas reserves 
increase stock return sensitivity to changes in oil and gas futures prices. In another 
study that looks at the gold mining industry, Jin and Jorion (2007) find that firms with 
hedging activities are associated with a discount to their firm value. Bartram et al.  
(2011) show the corporate use of derivatives globally generally has a weak relationship 
to firm value, although there is a significant positive relationship between derivatives 
and firm value during the economic downturn of 2001–2002. 
In one of the pioneering papers, Allayannis and Weston (2001) report a positive 
relationship between foreign currency hedging and firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q 
in a sample of 720 US non-financial firms. Hedged firms are found to be associated with 
a 5% average hedging premium compared to non-hedged firms. Graham and Rogers 
(2002) concur with this conclusion by reporting a hedging premium of 1.1% due to 
hedged firms’ ability to increase their debt capacity. However, Guay and Kothari (2003) 
examine a sample of 234 large non-financial corporations and demonstrate that the 
proportion of hedging activities is economically small in relation to their entity-level 
risk exposures and have no significant effect on firm values. They also argue that the 
result from Allayannis and Weston (2001) could be spurious as the increase in firm 
value is affected by other risk management activities such as operational hedging, which 
is correlated to derivatives hedging.  
Carter et al. (2006) examine jet fuel price hedging in a sample of 28 American 
airline companies and report a similar result to that of Allayannis and Weston (2001). 
Fuel hedging in this industry increases firm value by a significant 12-16% for hedged 
firms. Similarly, Bartram et al. (2003) find a positive impact of hedging activities on firm 
value by investigating interest rate hedging in a large sample of multi-industry 
companies.6 Mackay and Moeller (2007) advance a corporate risk management model 
in which hedging can add value if firms discriminately hedge concave revenues and 
leave concave costs unhedged. They show that the result of this discriminating hedge 
                                                        
5 Geczy et al. (1997) argue that examining the impact of hedging activities on multinational companies 
would be difficult because other factors such as foreign sales, foreign denominated debts and foreign tax 
also significantly affect firm value. Therefore, Jin and Jorion (2006) focuses on a homogeneous industry 
such as oil and gas or gold mining to provide more reliable results on the relationship between hedging 
and firm value. 
6
 Bartram et al. (2003), however, reported a statistically insignificant relationship between currency hedging and 
firm value. 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
program is a value enhancement of the magnitude of 2-3% for 34 oil refiners. Although 
not addressing the direct relationship between derivatives use and firm value, Gay et al. 
(2011) report that, all else being equal, derivatives use can lead to an increase in firm 
value through the reduction in the cost of equity. Their argument is that derivatives use 
can reduce the cost of financial distress, which is a component of systematic risk that is 
priced in equity returns. Finally, Aretz and Bartram (2010) provide a comprehensive 
review of theories and empirical evidence to date that concern corporate hedging and 
its impact on shareholder value. The study also highlights some of the challenges 
commonly encountered in this area of research.  
 
  
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
3. Data and Empirical Method 
3.1 Data  
Our initial sample is chosen by extracting from COMPUSTAT the list of firms with 
a Global Industry Classification Standard code of 1010, i.e. the Energy industry group. 
This industry group includes five sub-classes: Integrated Oil and Gas, Oil and Gas 
Exploration and Production, Oil and Gas Refining and Marketing, Oil and Gas Storage 
and Transportation Coal and Consumable Fuels. However, only companies belonging to 
the Oil and Gas Exploration and Production sub-classes are retained as these companies 
are more likely to have direct exposure to fluctuations in oil and gas prices. Further, 
consistent with Jin and Jorion (2006), only firms that meet the following selection 
criteria are retained in the sample: book value of total assets is greater than $20 
million;7 10-K reports are available from EDGAR; proved oil and gas reserves are 
reported in 10-K reports; and sufficient information in 10-K reports is available for the 
calculation of the hedge ratios.  The application of these filters produce a final sample of 
94 firms from 1998-2009, or 840 firm-year observations. A total of 52 different firms 
appear in all sample years.   
3.2 Variable Description 
3.2.1    Hedging 
Hedging information for each firm-year observation is manually collected from 
10-K annual reports from 1998-2009. The oil and gas industry in the US discloses more 
information compared to other countries because of the strict requirements. The US 
Security and Exchange Commission issued Financial Reporting Release (FRR) No. 48 in 
January 1997, which requires the disclosure of market risk information for all firms for 
fiscal years ending after June 1998. Under this rule, firms are required to report 
quantitative information about market risk in one of three formats: tabular, sensitivity 
analysis or value at risk. Oil and gas companies usually choose the tabular format.  
Under the tabular disclosure method, financial instruments are classified 
according to four characteristics: fixed or variable rate assets or liabilities; long or short 
forwards or futures; written or purchased put or call options; and fixed or variable 
swaps. In addition, SFAS 105, released by the FASB in June 1990, requires firms to 
disclose information about financial instruments with off balance sheet risk for fiscal 
years ending after 1990. In general, SFAS 105 and FRR 48 require firms to report 
contract amounts and the weighted average prices at which these contracts were 
entered. 
                                                        
7
  Jin and Jorion (2006) state that firms with total assets of less than $20 million, classified as “small business 
issuers”, have weaker disclosure requirements. Therefore, it is difficult to identify whether such firms do not 
hedge or do not disclose hedging information. 
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Following Jin and Jorion (2006), we measure hedging as the sum of delta 
equivalents of each position reported at the fiscal year-end.8 It is assumed that Δ = -1 for 
short positions and Δ=1 for long positions in all linear hedging instruments of crude oil 
and gas, such as short futures and forwards, swaps and fixed price contracts. For non-
linear contracts such as options and collars, hedging deltas are calculated by using the 
Black and Scholes’ option pricing model. After determining the delta for each contract, 
the deltas are aggregated to obtain the total delta for crude oil and gas. We develop two 
measures of delta relating to production and reserves as follows: 
Relative delta oil (gas) production = - Total delta oil (gas)/Next year oil (gas) production     (1)                                                                                                       
Relative delta oil (gas) reserve = - Total delta oil (gas)/Same-year proved oil (gas) reserves  (2)                                                                                                              
 Panel A of Table 1 provides a snapshot of the number of observations that have 
exposure to oil and gas prices, while Panel B shows the number of observations that 
engage in hedging. A firm is said to have oil/gas exposure when the firm explores and 
produces oil/gas and is thus exposed to the oil/gas price in that year. Out of 840 firm-
year observations, 812 have exposure to both oil and gas while 24 (4) have exposure to 
only gas (oil). Panel B partitions the sample into observations of oil hedgers and non-oil 
hedgers, and gas hedgers and non-gas hedgers. Most firms either hedge both oil and gas 
exposures (331 firm-years) or hedge neither of them (350 firm-years).  
3.2.2    Firm Value 
Consistent with the literature, in this study, firm value is measured by Tobin’s Q 
as defined by the market value of a company divided by the replacement value of total 
assets. Following Jin and Jorion (2006), three measures of Q are employed: 
 
assetstotalBV
equitycommonMVequitycommonBVassetstotalBV
Q

1     (3) 
reservesprovedgasMVoilreservesprovedgasBVoilassetstotalBV
equitycommonMVequitycommonBVassetstotalBV
Q
)()(
2


  (4) 
reservesprovedgasNPVoilreservesprovedgasBVoilassetstotalBV
equitycommonMVequitycommonBVassetstotalBV
Q
)()(
3


  (5) 
 
While the numerators in Equations (3), (4) and (5) are identical and approximate 
the market value of the firm, the denominators in these equations take different forms. 
Q1 is a simple Q ratio that uses the book value of total assets as a proxy for replacement 
cost. For Q2, the replacement cost is calculated as the book value of total assets plus the 
difference between the market value and the book value of the oil (gas) proved 
reserves. For Q3, the denominator is calculated by taking the book value of total assets 
                                                        
8
 This procedure provides a more reliable measure of the extent of hedging than notional amounts or a hedging 
dummy. This method also follows Tufano (1996). 
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minus the book value of oil/gas proved reserves, plus a “standardized measure of 
oil/gas proved reserves” — determined in accordance with the rules and regulations of 
the SEC and SFAS. The Net Present Value (NPV) of oil and gas proved reserves is 
measured as the present value of estimated future net revenues to be generated from 
the production of proved reserves less expenses such as general and administrative, 
debt service, future income tax, depreciation, depletion and amortization and 
discounted using an annual discount rate of 10%.9  
Descriptive statistics for the sample firms are presented in Table 2. Panel A 
describes the whole sample. The sub-sample of oil hedging activities and gas hedging 
activities are reported in Panels B and C, respectively. Panel D reports descriptive 
statistics for companies without hedging activities. Total assets are measured at book 
value. The value of oil and gas reserves is the standardized measure of proved oil and 
gas reserves, as reported in annual 10-K reports. Oil (gas) production hedged, Delta Pro, 
is the amount of production hedged divided by the actual oil (gas) production next year. 
As indicated earlier, this measure effectively gives an indication of the proportion of 
next year’s production that is hedged using financial derivatives. The oil (gas) reserves 
hedged, Delta Res, is the amount of reserves hedged divided by the oil (gas) reserves for 
the same year.  
As shown in Panel A of Table 2, the average total assets across the entire sample 
is around $2.42 billion. In addition, 10% of the companies have assets equal to or less 
than $34 million and, similarly, 10% of firms have total assets of approximately more 
than $5.3 billion. The median total assets is also considerably less than the mean, which 
implies a skewed distribution caused by a number of extreme observations.  
Panels B, C and D further show that the average total assets for oil hedging firms 
is around $4.12 billion, $4.108 billion for gas hedging firms and $0.421 billion for non-
hedging firms. The mean total assets of non-hedging firms is significantly less than that 
of firms that hedge. This result is consistent with previous studies, which show that 
larger firms are more likely to hedge than smaller firms. The market value of equity 
(MVE) demonstrates similar patterns. The mean of proved reserves value for the 
sample is around $1.96 billion, which is more than 80% of average total assets across 
                                                        
9  The information needed for the calculation of NPV is obtained from the 10-K annual reports. The 
market value of the reserve is calculated by multiplying the quantity of the reserve by the market oil/gas 
price as at 31 December of a particular year. Oil and gas firms are required to report the present value of 
earnings from total oil and gas reserves as per SFAS No. 69. In addition, they are required to show the 
present value of their reserves by using Discounted Future Net Cash Flows with a standard rate of 10%. 
Estimates of the quantities of proved reserves and the future periods during which they are expected to 
be produced are made, based on year-end economic conditions. Therefore, the number of years that the 
proved reserve can be extracted should be determined by the ratio between the proved reserve and the 
production of the firm. On average across our sample, the ratios are 10.65 and 10.80 years for oil and gas 
reserves, respectively. 
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the sample. For oil and gas hedging firms, the proved oil and gas reserves make up 82% 
and 81% of their total assets, on average, respectively.   
The values of Q1 and Q3 are quite similar in all settings and are much higher than 
the value of Q2. This is due to the fact that the denominator of Q2 includes the market 
value of oil and gas reserves. This variable is calculated by multiplying the quantity of 
proved oil and gas reserves by the market price, and these values are substantially 
greater than the book value of oil and gas reserves — leading to a higher denominator 
for Q2. For the whole sample, the average values of Q1, Q2, and Q3 are 1.86, 0.52, and 
1.76, respectively, while the associated medians are 1.42, 0.40, and 1.44.  More 
importantly, it is observed that the Q ratios for oil and gas hedging firms are lower than 
those of non-hedging firms. This observation holds for all three measures of Q ratios.  
Of the firms that hedge, the mean (median) production delta is 37.94% (31.34%) 
of next year’s oil production, which is approximately 3.78% (2.75%) of proved oil 
reserves. The mean (median) gas delta is approximately 37.43% (33.61%) of next year’s 
gas production, which amounts to approximately 3.73% (3.02%) of proved gas 
reserves. These figures are comparable to Jin and Jorion (2006). 
Table 3 further reveals information regarding the type of instruments used in 
hedging. For oil hedgers, 104 (27.6%) hedge using options only, and 173 (45.9%) hedge 
using only linear payoff contracts such as futures, forwards or swaps. In contrast, 100 
(26.5%) employ both types of contracts in their hedging programs. The statistics are 
somewhat similar for gas hedgers, with 90 (20.3%) utilizing options only, 176 (39.6%) 
using non-option contracts only and 178 (40.1%) using both types of contracts.  
Further descriptive statistics presented in Table 4 confirm the more important 
role that linear payoff contracts play in hedging commodity price risk. In particular, 
24.5% (25.7%) of next year’s oil (gas) production is hedged using either 
futures/forwards or swaps, while options hedging only accounts for 13.4% (11.7%) of 
next year’s oil (gas) production. Similarly, 2.5% of the current reserves (oil or gas) are 
hedged using linear payoff contracts and about 1.25% are hedged using options.  
 
3.2.3    Control Variables 
Following previous studies (Allayannis and Weston, 2001; Jin and Jorion, 2006), 
several control variables are employed: firm size (natural logarithm of total assets), 
profitability (return on assets), investment growth (capital expenditures to total assets), 
access to financial markets (a dummy variable equaling 1 if the firm makes any payout 
to shareholders in a particular fiscal year and 0 otherwise), leverage (book value of debt 
to market value of equity) and production costs (the cost of extracting oil and natural 
gas, which includes both the lifting cost and production taxes). Information regarding 
production cost is collected manually from firms’ 10-K annual reports on the basis of 
per Boe (Barrel of oil equivalent) for oil production and per Mcfe (thousand cubic feet 
equivalent) for gas production.  
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3.3 Method 
3.3.1    Cross-sectional Regression Analysis  
To test the relationship between hedging and firm value, the following basic 
pooled cross-sectional regressions are estimated: 
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j
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    (6) 
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j
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Re     (8) 
where the Q ratio proxies for firm value and is log transformed following Jin and Jorion 
(2006), Lang and Stulz (1994) and Allayannis and Weston (2001) among others. 
Hedging variables include a hedging dummy (HedDum), delta production (DeltaPro) and 
delta reserves (DeltaRes). The hedging dummy takes the value of 1 if the firm 
implements hedging activities in that year and is 0 otherwise. Delta production is the 
ratio between total hedging positions and next year’s oil/gas production. Delta reserves 
is the ratio of total hedges to proved oil/gas reserves in the same year. Equations (6) to 
(8) are estimated for both the oil and gas samples.  
One of our important goals is to examine how commodity price regimes impact 
the dynamics between hedging and firm value. In particular, derivatives usage is 
expected to provide benefits for the firm when oil and gas prices fall, as derivatives 
contracts allow them to lock in a selling price that is likely to be higher than the market 
price at the time of delivery. To test for this potential effect, we undertake two 
approaches. In the first instance, we develop an “up-market” dummy variable,  , which 
equals 1 if the return on oil/gas is positive during a particular year and 0 otherwise. The 
dummy variable is allowed to interact with the hedging variables as follows: 
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We predict a negative sign for    and a positive sign for    as hedging is expected to add 
(reduce) value when oil/gas prices decline (rise).  
In the second approach, the continuously compounded return on oil/gas prices 
during a particular year, Roil/gas, is interacted with the hedging variables as follows: 
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Our coefficient of interest,   , is expected to be negative. A negative relationship 
between the annual return on oil/gas and firm market value is also expected in 
Equations (12) to (14).   
Finally, we distinguish between contracts with linear payoffs and non-linear 
payoffs. Specifically, we re-calculate the continuous hedging variables to differentiate 
between the extent of production and reserve hedging that is attributable to non-linear 
payoff contracts (DeltaPro_Option and DeltaRes_Option) and hedging that is attributable 
to linear payoff contracts (DeltaPro_NonOption and DeltaRes_NonOption). The following 
regressions are estimated: 
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(16) 
We hypothesize that when commodity prices decrease, linear and non-linear 
payoff derivatives contracts are not discernible from each other in enhancing firm value 
as both of these contract types allow producers to lock in selling prices that are more 
favourable than prevailing market prices. However, when commodity prices increase, 
the use of non-linear payoff contracts should be more valuable as they limit the losses 
from the hedged positions, resulting in a lower hedging discount. In particular, we 
expect that    <     < 0.  
3.3.2    Time-series tests – Fama French Framework 
To complement the multivariate regressions described above, we pursue an 
asset pricing approach using the Fama French three-factor model to examine whether a 
hypothetical portfolio consisting of a long position in the hedged firms and a short 
position in the non-hedged firms produces a positive alpha. Moreover, within this 
alternative setting, we investigate whether the alpha is conditional on particular market 
conditions.  
Assessing the value of corporate hedging using the Fama-French three-factor 
model has a number of benefits. First, the alpha coefficient provides an ex-ante measure 
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of the hedging premium which is far more meaningful than an ex-post assessment of the 
value of hedging.10 Second, the alpha coefficient is a more reliable measure of the value 
of hedging compared to Tobin’s Q. Tobin’s Q, while very popular, is a biased measure of 
firm value for hedged firms to the extent that hedging has the potential to maintain firm 
liquidity at a desired level and thus improve the firm’s ability to invest and acquire new 
oil/gas reserves. The ability to invest and acquire new oil/gas reserves associated with 
hedging can be viewed as a flexibility option, with its value not necessarily reflected in 
the calculation of Tobin’s Q.11  
In the initial stage, we test for a hedging premium by running the following 
regression (similar to e.g. Aboody and Lev, 2000; Nguyen et al., 2010): 
                                                     
(17) 
where           (            ) is the production hedging-weighted (equal weighted) 
return in month t of a portfolio comprising (non-) hedgers.      is the market return 
and      is the risk free rate.  SMBt  is the difference between the return on a portfolio of 
small stocks and a portfolio of big stocks. HMLt is the difference between the return on a 
portfolio of high book-to-market ratio stocks and a portfolio of low book-to-market 
stocks.12 A positive (negative) α indicates a hedging premium (discount). 
To extend the analysis, we further partition the intercept into two parts that 
relate to market conditions defined by an oil/gas price increase versus a counterpart 
price decrease. In particular, the regression is specified as follows: 
                                                                     
(18) 
where       (       ) is a dummy variable equaling 1 if the price of crude oil/natural 
gas increases (decreases). Comparing coefficients    and    allows us to make 
inferences on the value of hedging subject to different market conditions.  
One of the defining characteristics of our sampling period is elevated oil and gas 
prices. As a result, we also aim to test for a “price level” effect by estimating the 
following modified model:13  
                                                                      (19)  
 
                                                        
10
 Although hedgers and non-hedgers can generally only be identified ex-post, decisions to hedge between years 
are highly correlated. That is, a firm that hedges in year t is most likely to hedge in year t+1. Similarly, a firm 
that doesn’t hedge in year t is not likely to hedge in year t+1. In addition, hedgers can sometimes be identified 
in prior year(s) due to long-dated hedging contracts that remain effective in future years. As a result, an ex-ante 
trading strategy can be constructed based on firm hedging history.  
11
 We are extremely grateful to an anonymous referee who alerted us to these important points.  
12
All data for the right hand side variables are collected from Kenneth R. French’s website at: 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. 
13
 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this line of inquiry. 
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where          = 1 (       = 1) if crude oil/gas price is greater (less) than the sample 
median or 0 otherwise. In addition, we employ a two-way interaction between 
           and          to investigate the price effect in times of crude oil/natural 
gas price increase/decrease.  
                                                                        
                                             
 (20
) 
Finally, to investigate how commodity price volatility impacts the dynamics 
between hedging and firm value, we construct two dummy variables based on the 
implied volatility of one-year options on oil and natural gas futures contracts that are 
traded on the New York Mercantile Exchange. The dummy        = 1 (      = 1) if 
implied oil/gas price volatility is greater (less) than the sample median or 0 otherwise. 
We then estimate the following regression: 
                                                                        (21) 
 
To vary the analysis, we condition the intercept on a continuous implied 
volatility measure as follows: 
                                                                    (22) 
 
where (to aid interpretation) the implied volatility (IV) variable is “median-adjusted”. 
Therefore, α0 reflects the average hedging premium when the median IV occurs, while 
α1 represents the rate that the hedging premium changes as the IV changes. 
 
4. Results  
4.1 Tobin’s Q Analysis 
The results of multivariate modeling of Tobin’s Q are reported in Table 5, where 
Panel A shows the outcome of pooled cross-sectional time-series least squares 
regression with firm value measured by Ln(Q1), while in Panels B and C, the dependent 
variable is Ln(Q2) and Ln(Q3), respectively. To make the analysis comparable to other 
studies, initially we focus on results from Panel A with the Q1 measure for which the 
denominator is the book value of total assets.  
The estimated coefficient on the hedging dummy is negative and significant at 
the 1% level for both oil and gas, which suggests a hedging discount. Based on these 
results in Panel A, firms with oil (gas) hedging activities are associated with a lower 
market value of 11.9% (14.7%). The result is similar in Panel C where firm value is 
measured by Q3. Firms with oil hedging activities have a 14.3% lower market value. The 
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result in relation to the hedging dummy is rather striking in that hedging is associated 
with a firm value discount of a substantial magnitude.  
Panel A also reports negative and significant coefficients on production hedging 
for both oil and gas regressions — once again indicating that hedging is associated with 
lower firm value. Specifically, the coefficient of delta production for oil (gas) companies 
is –0.215 (-0.171), which implies that a 1% increase in the extent of which next year’s 
production is hedged is associated with a 0.215% (0.171%) decrease in firm value. An 
alternative interpretation is that if a non-hedger were to switch from a no hedging 
policy to a full hedging policy, i.e. hedge 100% of their oil (gas) production the following 
year, their firm value would be lowered by 21.5% (17.1%). However, as oil (gas) 
producers in our sample, on average, hedge around 37.94% (37.43%) of their gas 
production in the next year, the implied average effect of hedging activities on firm 
value is a discount of 8.2% (6.4%). The delta production coefficients are also not 
significant for regressions using Q2 and Q3.  
The results are mixed in relation to the delta reserves variable, measured as the 
ratio of the total hedge position over proven oil/gas reserves in the same fiscal year. A 
strong negative (i.e. discount) result is obtained from the Q1 measure as reported in 
Panel A. In terms of economic significance, when taking into account the fact that firms 
on average only hedge 3.78% (3.73%) of their total oil (gas) reserves, the hedging 
discount can be realistically estimated to be 7.4% and 6.7% for oil and gas hedgers, 
respectively.  
 Table 5 further shows that most control variables have expected signs across all 
panels. The coefficient on log total assets is negative and significant at the 1% level in 
Panels A and B, consistent with Lang and Stulz (1994) and Allayannis and Weston 
(2001). The coefficient on growth (measured as the ratio of capital expenditure over 
total assets) shows a statistically positive relationship with respect to firm value. The 
market gives a premium to firms with high capital expenditure and investment 
opportunities, which supports the evidence from Allayannis and Weston (2001). Firms 
with any form of payout (dividend or share repurchase) during the fiscal year have a 
significantly higher Q ratio as payouts can indicate positive signals from management 
about future profitability. Firms with higher leverage are associated with a lower Q 
ratio. Production costs, on the other hand, do not appear to have any impact on firm 
value. Return on assets (ROA) is the only variable that does not conform to 
expectations: ROA is associated with lower firm value, which is counter intuitive as 
profitable firms are expected to be more highly valued by the market.  
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4.2 The Value of Hedging Conditional on Commodity Price Movements 
The impact of commodity price movements on the dynamics of the relationship 
between hedging and firm value are reported in Table 6.14 As previously explained, we 
capture the effect of commodity price movements using two different approaches. In the 
first instance, we use a dummy variable indicating whether the oil/gas price has risen in 
a particular year. Second, we calculate a continuous variable that measures the return 
on the oil/gas price.  
As is evident in Table 6, regardless of the way Tobin’s Q is calculated, corporate 
hedging of oil and gas is directly related to a discount during periods of increasing 
prices (significant at the 1% level in most cases). The strength of this relationship 
manifests in both facets of the hedging decision: to hedge or not and how much to 
hedge. In general, firms that hedge during periods of increasing prices experience lower 
firm value than non-hedgers. In addition, as firms hedge more and more of their future 
production and current oil/gas reserves, their firm value is further penalized by the 
market. In economic terms, the existence of an oil hedging program during inflationary 
price periods results in a hedging discount of about 20-23% if firms are fully hedged. 
Similarly, the incidence of gas hedging is related to lower firm value (14-20% under a 
fully hedged scenario).  
The results for the other hedging variables, DeltaPro and DeltaRes, also support 
the hypothesis that hedging activities during periods of upward price movements are 
associated with lower firm value. For oil, the significant negative coefficients for delta 
production suggest a 13% value discount for an average firm that hedges 38% of future 
production. The extent of oil reserves hedged, as measured by DeltaRes, similarly shows 
a hedging discount of up to 10% for a typical firm that hedges 3.8% of their current oil 
reserves. The gas models produce qualitatively similar results, although the discounts 
are somewhat smaller.  
Of particular note, however, is the fact that the hedging discount is only present 
during periods of increasing prices. During periods when oil and gas prices fall, hedging 
is either value neutral or, in some cases, associated with higher firm value as measured 
by Q2 and Q3. This finding, however, appears to be stronger for gas as opposed to oil. In 
terms of economic significance, the extent of any hedging premium is, on average, 
around 12%. These figures are broadly consistent with Allayannis and Weston (2001), 
Carter et al. (2006) and Lookman (2003), who report that hedging creates a premium of 
3.6% to 14% and can, in some excessive cases, reach 16%-26%.  
The results documented in Table 6 highlight the important conditioning effect of 
price movement in the relationship between hedging and firm value. Indeed, the overall 
negative relationship between hedging and firm value documented in Table 5 appears 
to be driven predominantly by the fact that despite short term fluctuations, oil and gas 
                                                        
14
 To conserve space, the coefficients relating to the control variables are not reported here or in all remaining 
tables. They are available from authors upon request.  
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
prices have generally followed an upward trend over our sample period. In particular, 
the price of oil and gas has increased in 7 and 8 years, respectively, out of 12 sampling 
years.  
Our finding that the relationship between hedging and firm value is largely 
conditional on the movement of the underlying asset price is further reinforced in our 
analysis whereby continuous return measures are used to gauge the extent of the price 
movement. We find overwhelmingly strong evidence that when oil/gas prices increase, 
hedging destroys rather than adds to firm value.15  
4.3 Fama French Three-factor Alpha  
The results from our initial Fama French specification that aims at identifying the 
baseline “ex ante” value of hedging are presented in Panel A of Table 7. The coefficient 
of interest, alpha, is a risk-adjusted measure of the value of hedging. In particular, it 
shows the risk-adjusted difference between the return of a portfolio of hedgers and a 
portfolio of non-hedgers.  
As can be seen from Panel A, both oil and gas hedgers are found to underperform 
compared to their respective non-hedger counterparts by a magnitude of approximately 
1% a month. This result is largely consistent with the previously documented notion of 
a hedging discount for our sample period.16 In Panel B, we extend the analysis to 
identify whether the hedging discount is related to specific market conditions. In this 
vein, we split the intercept into two parts that relate to market conditions, defined by 
increasing versus decreasing oil and gas prices. Interestingly, our analysis shows that 
hedgers only underperform against non-hedgers during periods of increasing oil and 
gas prices. Specifically, we find that compared to non-hedgers, oil and gas hedgers have 
monthly stock returns that are around 2% lower when the price of oil/gas increases. On 
the other hand, during periods characterized by falling oil and gas prices, the risk-
adjusted market performance of hedgers is not statistically distinguishable from that of 
non-hedgers.  
Table 8 presents results relating to the price level effect. We find that the price 
level per se does not play a major role in affecting the market value of hedging, with the 
exception of gas hedgers who seem to underperform when gas price levels are below 
the median price (Panel A). Interacting the price level variable with the direction of the 
price movement, however, produces interesting results. Specifically, as shown in Panel 
B, oil and gas hedgers severely underperform against their non-hedging counterparts in 
the vicinity of 2.2-2.5% per month when the price is both high and increasing. 
                                                        
15
 To conserve space, we refrain from tabulating these results. They are available from authors upon request. 
16
 In unreported results, we also find that firms that never hedged over the entire sample window significantly 
outperform hedged firms. In addition, we fail to find any evidence that active hedgers (those that have larger 
than the median standard deviation of the annual hedge ratios) perform any better than non-active hedgers (those 
that have smaller than the median standard deviation of the annual hedge ratios). We thank an anonymous 
referee for prompting us to undertake these additional analyses.    
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Additionally, when the gas price is low and increasing, gas hedgers underperform as 
well. For all other market conditions, we fail to find any difference in the performance of 
hedgers and non-hedgers. 
Our final set of Fama French model results focus on the impact of ex ante 
volatility on the value of hedging–firm value paradigm presented in Table 9. Using 
implied volatility as an ex-ante measure of oil and gas price volatility, the results in 
Panel A show that volatility does not appear to impact the hedging–firm value 
relationship for oil companies. Regardless of the volatility level, oil hedgers and non-
hedger portfolios do not demonstrate any statistically significant difference in their 
market returns. In contrast, there is some evidence that gas hedgers underperform 
against their non-hedger counterparts in a low volatility environment. This result is 
largely consistent with the widely-held belief that hedging is more valuable when there 
is high volatility in the price of the underlying asset. In Panel B of Table 9, we present 
results that aim to identify the impact of hedging on firm value as volatility changes (as 
a continuous variable). No significant pattern is evident.  
In summary, the Fama-French three factor model results are consistent with our 
findings documented in the preceding section. In general, there is a hedging discount for 
oil and gas exploration and production companies over our sample period. Importantly, 
this hedging discount is specifically related to periods of elevating oil and gas prices 
(especially if the price is high). The findings provide strong support to our main 
conjecture that, in assessing the value of hedging for oil and gas exploration and 
production companies, it is the direction of oil and gas price movements that matters. 
 
4.4 Robustness Checks
17
 
4.4.1  Hedging and Firm Value: Linear Payoff Versus Non-linear Payoff Derivatives  
As a first robustness check, we examine the merit of linear payoff contracts as 
opposed to non-linear payoff contracts in hedging commodity price risk. In unreported 
results, and in the presence of commodity price increases, we find that the use of non-
option contracts consistently relates to lower firm value for both oil and gas producers. 
Interestingly, there is some evidence to indicate that despite price increases, the use of 
options contracts has a positive correlation with firm value. Taken together, it can be 
concluded that the market penalizes linear payoff contracts more severely during 
periods of adverse price movements.  
Nevertheless, when oil and gas prices decrease, options hedging in general does 
not portray any statistically significant relationship to firm value — plausibly, due to the 
fact that any potential gains on the contracts are somewhat offset by the initial 
premiums. Linear payoff hedging contracts, as expected, are generally associated with a 
hedging premium in this situation. Overall, our results provide some support for the 
                                                        
17
 To conserve space, we refrain from tabulating the results relating to sub-sections 4.4.1 to 4.4.3. They are 
available from the authors upon request. 
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widely-believed notion that options are more valuable to oil and gas producers than 
linear payoff contracts in periods of adverse price movements. 
 4.4.2    Outlier Removal 
The main purpose of this exercise is to minimize the noise in the data and to 
depict the relationship between hedging and firm value more reliably. Specifically, 
observations with production hedging ratios (delta) in excess of 1 are removed from the 
sample. A delta greater than 1 suggests that the firm hedges more than 100% of next 
year’s production. As a result, derivatives usage in these firms may be driven by factors 
other than a desire to hedge oil and gas exposures. A total of 22 firm-year observations 
are removed in total from both oil and gas samples. This process has minimal impact, 
however, as hedging continues to be associated with lower firm value when oil and gas 
prices increase, while the relationship takes on a positive value when oil/gas prices 
decrease.  
 4.4.3     Fixed Effects 
As another robustness check, the fixed effect model is used to estimate the coefficients 
instead of the pooled OLS model. There are characteristics that are difficult to observe 
or measure, and which vary across firms but remain constant over time, or vary across 
periods but remain constant across firms. By using the simplest and most common 
method of balanced panel data — pooled OLS — the estimator can be biased because 
this method does not take into account the effect of heterogeneity. The (unreported) 
results are very robust to the alternative estimation technique; there is a negative 
relationship between hedging and firm value conditional on increasing oil/gas prices 
while, in the presence of falling prices, hedging has a positive impact on firm value.  
 
4.4.4     Causality Test 
In this section, we address the potential causality issue in which both firm value and 
derivatives usage are endogenously determined. For this purpose, we re-estimate our 
baseline regressions using 2 stage least squares (2SLS). Identifying good instrumental 
variables that are correlated with hedging but only influence firm value through their 
impact on hedging is a challenging task. In the context of Equations (6) to (8), we choose 
the lagged variable HedDum (-1), percentage of Directors with an accounting 
background and percentage of CEO compensation in cash as the instrumental 
variables.18 A director with an accounting background is defined as having either a 
degree in accounting or holding an industry certification such as CPA or CA. CEO 
compensation in cash is defined as cash salary plus cash bonuses. The logic underlying 
our choice of these instrumental variables is as follows. A board that is more dominated 
by directors with an accounting background is more likely to be conservative and, 
hence, the company is more likely to hedge. On the other hand, the higher is the 
percentage of cash remuneration to which the CEO is entitled, the lower are the 
                                                        
18
 Due to extreme difficulty involved in collecting reliable and complete data on director’s accounting 
background and CEO compensation, we confine this extended analysis to the period 2005 – 2009.  
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incentives for the CEO to participate in activities with uncertain outcomes. A higher 
propensity to hedge is therefore likely to follow.  
Table 10 reports the 2SLS results and we see that for LnQ1 there is still evidence 
of a negative relationship between hedging and firm value, although such evidence is 
weaker and limited to gas producers only.  However, in terms of economic significance, 
the 2SLS results suggest a higher hedging discount. For example, firms with gas hedging 
activities are associated with a lower market value of 19.1%, compared to a hedging 
discount of 14.7% reported previously. Not only is the incidence of hedging behaviour 
related to lower firm value for gas producers, the extent of hedging as measured by 
DeltaRes also appears to be associated with more severe hedging discounts. Specifically, 
a 1% increase in the hedging of next year’s total gas reserves is associated with a 
4.279% decrease in firm value for gas hedgers under a fully hedged scenario. Given that 
firms on average only hedge 3.73% of their total gas reserves, the hedging discount can 
meaningfully be expressed as approximately 16% for gas hedgers. Similar to the OLS 
results, when LnQ2 and LnQ3 are used as measures of firm value, we find no evidence of 
a hedging discount.  
In unreported results, we also re-estimate Equations (9) to (11) using 2SLS. This 
alternative analysis reinforces our findings reported earlier that the relationship 
between firm value and hedging is strongly conditional on commodity price 
movements. In particular, the hedging discount is largely symptomatic of increasing oil 
and gas prices.  
We also report test statistics for the Sargan test in Table 10, whereby the null 
hypothesis is that the instrumental variables are exogenous, i.e. they are uncorrelated to 
some set of residuals. We fail to reject this null hypothesis in all cases, which suggests 
that our chosen instrumental variables are valid. However, the Hausman test shows that 
the hedging variable is exogenous, which suggests that using 2SLS might not be 
necessary (at least from a statistical point of view).  
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we present an empirical study of the impact of hedging on firm 
value across a broad sample of 94 US oil and gas exploration and production companies 
over the period of 1998 to 2009. We document a negative and significant relationship 
between hedging and firm value, i.e. a hedging discount. At a theoretical level, hedging 
can enhance firm value by reducing the costs relating to underinvestment and financial 
distress. Nevertheless, there is little reason to expect that these costs materialize in the 
presence of upside risk. As a result, unlike the previously believed notion that hedging 
always adds value, we hypothesize that hedging adds value only in the presence of 
downside risk, when underinvestment and financial distress risks are more substantial. 
Empirically, we provide strong evidence that for a sample of oil and gas producers, 
when oil and gas prices increase, hedging generally relates to lower firm value. In 
contrast, when oil and gas prices decline, hedging and firm value are unrelated.  
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  The main contribution of this paper relates to our key finding that the ability of 
corporate hedging via the use of derivatives in influencing firm market value is 
asymmetric and largely conditional on the movement of the underlying asset price. This 
finding helps explain the variation in results previously documented in the literature 
regarding the relationship between hedging and firm value.  
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Figure 1: Crude Oil and Natural Gas Prices 1998 – 2009 
 
  
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
10 
12 
0 
20 
40 
60 
80 
100 
120 
140 
160 
Jan-1998 Jan-2000 Jan-2002 Jan-2004 Jan-2006 Jan-2008 
N
a
tu
ra
l g
a
s 
p
ri
ce
 (
$
/
M
m
b
tu
) 
O
il
 p
ri
ce
 (
$
/
B
b
l)
 
Oil Price 
Gas Price 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
 
 
 
 
  
Table 1:  Description of Sample by Exposure and Hedging Decisions 
Panel A splits the total sample of 840 firm-years into observations with and without oil exposure, 
and with and without gas exposure.  The observation is said to have oil/gas exposure when the firm 
explores and produces oil/gas and thus are exposed to oil/gas prices in that year. Panel B partitions 
the sample into observations with or without hedging activities as oil hedgers and non-oil hedgers 
and as gas hedgers and non-gas hedgers. 
Panel A: Distribution of Exposures Across Firm-Years 
 
Oil exposure Non-oil exposure Total 
Gas exposure 812 24 836 
Non-gas exposure 4 0 4 
Total 816 24 840 
Panel B : Distribution of Hedging Decisions for Firm-Years with Exposure to Both Factors 
 
Oil Hedgers Non-oil Hedgers Total 
Gas hedgers 331 113 444 
Non-gas hedgers 46 350 396 
Total 377 463 840 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for Firm Characteristics 
Panel A describes the sample of 94 US oil and gas companies from 1998 to 2009. Sub-samples of firm-
years with oil hedging activity are reported in Panel B and those with gas hedging activity are reported in 
Panel C. Panel D describes firm-years without any hedging activity. Total assets represent BV of assets. 
The value of reserves is the standardized measure of oil and gas reserves, as reported in 10-K annual 
reports. Oil/gas production hedged is the total amount of hedging divided by the actual production next 
year. Oil/gas reserves hedged is the amount of hedging divided by the oil/gas reserves reported for the 
same year. The three Q ratios share the same numerator and differ only in the denominator. Numerator = 
BV total assets – BV common equity + MV common equity. The denominators for Q1, Q2, Q3, are BV total 
assets; BV total assets – BV oil/gas proved reserves + MV proved reserves; and BV total assets – BV 
oil/gas proved reserves + NPV proved reserves, respectively. 
  Mean SD Median 10th perc 90th perc Max 
Panel A: All Firm-Years  (N=840) 
Total Assets 
($m) 
 
2,420 6,339 387 34 5,287 58,844 
MVE  ($m)  2,035 4,939 341 26 4,739 39,495 
Reserves ($m)  1,962 4,997 315 21 4,473 48,739 
Q1  1.86 1.83 1.42 0.90 2.99 16.22 
Q2  0.52 0.80 0.40 0.19 0.88 6.60 
Q3  1.76 1.73 1.44 0.66 2.98 12.72 
Panel B: Firm-Years with Oil Hedging Activity (N=377) 
Total Assets 
($m)  4,120 8,196 908 162 10,247 58,844 
MVE ($m)  3,214 5,942 844 82 8,583 35,803 
Reserves ($m)  3,370 6,575 797 118 8,478 48,739 
Oil Delta Pro 
(%)  37.94 30.10 31.34 5.77 78.56 182.34 
Oil Delta Res 
(%)  3.78 3.73 2.75 0.47 8.59 30.86 
Q1  1.51 0.54 1.39 0.93 2.17 4.35 
Q2  0.43 0.33 0.40 0.18 0.71 2.13 
Q3  1.59 1.49 1.44 0.71 2.44 7.70 
Panel C: Firm-Years with Gas Hedging Activity (N=444) 
Total Assets 
($m)  4108 8237 942 147 10539 58,844 
MVE ($m)  3429 6413 879 67 9638 39,495 
Reserves ($m)  3327 6484 822 118 8495 48,739 
Gas Delta Pro 
(%)  37.43 26.49 33.61 5.60 72.50 166.98 
Gas Delta Res 
(%)  3.73 3.14 3.02 0.57 7.81 19.97 
Q1  1.57 0.89 1.37 0.95 2.29 10.54 
Q2  0.43 0.29 0.40 0.21 0.69 2.13 
Q3  1.67 1.44 1.48 0.78 2.62 7.42 
Panel D: Firm-Years without Hedging Activity (N=350) 
Total Assets 
($m)  421 922 86 19 1,249 8,934 
MVE  ($m)  391 742 120 13 956 6,839 
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Reserves ($m)  355 855 59 7 1,164 8,013 
Q1  2.24 2.59 1.46 0.79 4.13 16.22 
Q2  0.63 1.18 0.43 0.17 1.18 6.60 
Q3  1.90 2.08 1.32 0.55 3.81 12.72 
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Table 3: Types of Financial Derivatives by Frequency of Usage 
This table details the frequency of usage for linear-payoff instruments such as futures, forwards and 
swaps versus non-linear payoff instruments such as options for hedgers. Panel A presents the frequency 
of usage for oil hedgers and Panel B shows the results for gas hedgers. 
Panel A: Oil Producers 
 Options No Options Total 
Futures/Swaps 100 173 273 
No Futures/Swaps 104 0 104 
Total 204 173 377 
Panel B: Gas Producers 
 Options No options Total 
Futures/Swaps 178 176 354 
No Futures/Swaps 90 0 90 
Total 268 176 444 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for the Types of Financial Derivatives used by Oil 
and Gas Hedgers 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for hedging deltas corresponding to different types of 
financial derivatives. Non-option Delta_Pro is the ratio of next year’s production hedged using non-
option contracts such as futures/forwards and swaps. Option Delta_Pro is the ratio of next year’s 
production hedged using options. Non-option Delta_Res is the proportion of total reserves hedged using 
non-option contracts. Similarly, Option Delta_Res is the proportion of total reserves hedged using option 
contracts. Panel A and Panel B present the descriptive statistics in relation to oil hedgers and gas 
hedgers, respectively.  
Panel A: Oil Hedgers 
 
Non-Option 
Delta_Pro Option Delta_Pro 
Non-Option  
Delta_ es Option Delta_Res 
Mean 24.51% 13.43% 2.50% 1.28% 
Median 16.65% 1.30% 1.39% 0.06% 
SD 27.96% 20.94% 3.36% 2.08% 
Min 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Max 138.48% 140.77% 19.61% 13.91% 
Panel B: Gas Hedgers 
 
Non-Option 
Delta_Pro Option Delta_Pro 
Non-Option  
Delta_Res Option Delta_Res 
Mean 25.72% 11.71% 2.48% 1.25% 
Median 19.26% 3.14% 1.75% 0.31% 
SD 26.43% 17.03% 2.87% 2.08% 
Min 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Max 137.52% 100.59% 19.97% 13.20% 
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Table 5: Hedging and Firm Value — Baseline Cross-sectional Results 
This table presents the results of the pooled cross-sectional time-series least squares 
regressions on the impact of hedging on firm value. The models are presented as Equations 
(6), (7) and (8) in the main text. The three alternative dependent variables are measured by 
the natural log of Q1, Q2, and Q3. The sample includes 94 firms from 1998 to 2009, or a total of 
840 firm-year observations. The variable HedDum is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
company hedges; DeltaPro is delta production and is calculated as the ratio of the total value 
of hedges to production; and delta reserves (DeltaRes) is the ratio of total value of hedges to 
reserves. The control variables are as follows: log (assets) is the log of BV of total assets; ROA 
is the ratio of net income to total assets; Investment growth is the ratio of capital expenditure 
over total assets; Leverage is the BV of long-term debt over MV of common equity; Payout 
dummy equals 1 if the firm has some form of payout via either dividends or share 
repurchases in the current year; and Production cost is the dollar cost per barrel of oil 
equivalent. For brevity, the reporting of control variables is suppressed in Panels B and C. t-
statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
 Oil Gas 
 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Panel A: Dependent Variable is LnQ1 
Constant 0.468*** 0.488*** 0.547*** 0.486*** 0.532*** 0.526*** 
 
(6.40) (6.86) (7.73) (6.49) (7.30) (7.33) 
Hedging dummy -0.119*** 
  
-0.147***   
 
(-2.80) 
  
(-3.36)   
DeltaPro 
 
-0.215*** 
  
-0.171**  
 
 
(-3.02) 
  
(-2.38)  
DeltaRes 
  
-1.968*** 
 
 -1.798*** 
 
  
(-3.25) 
 
 (-2.70) 
Log(assets) -0.093*** -0.107*** -0.123*** -0.074*** -0.108*** -0.103*** 
 
(-3.43) (-4.32) (-5.06) (-2.62) (-4.39) (-4.20) 
ROA 0.134 0.132 0.058 0.140 0.141 0.150 
 
(1.45) (1.43) (0.61) (1.52) (1.53) (1.64) 
Invest Growth 0.847*** 0.840*** 0.830*** 0.860*** 0.845*** 0.835*** 
 
(6.53) (6.47) (6.40) (6.77) (6.63) (6.62) 
Payout dummy 0.086* 0.086* 0.128*** 0.074* 0.081* 0.071 
 
(1.94) (1.95) (2.88) (1.67) (1.82) (1.60) 
Leverage -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* 
 
(-1.78) (-1.81) (-1.92) (-1.84) (-1.79) (-1.93) 
Production Cost 0.005 0.005 0.003 -0.001 0.002 -0.003 
  (1.42) (1.49) (0.74) (-0.06) (0.10) (-0.16) 
Observations 735 735 715 739 739 737 
R-squared 9.93% 10.09% 11.17% 10.11% 9.42% 9.40% 
Panel B: Dependent Variable is LnQ2 
Constant -0.647*** -0.644*** -0.578*** -0.675*** -0.652*** -0.638*** 
 
(-7.03) (-7.18) (-6.33) (-7.15) (-7.12) (-6.99) 
Hedging 
dummy 
-0.044 
  
-0.058   
 
(-0.82) 
  
(-1.05)   
DeltaPro 
 
-0.109 
  
-0.032  
 
 
(-1.22) 
  
(-0.35)  
DeltaRes 
  
1.459* 
 
 1.304 
 
  
(1.87) 
 
 (1.54) 
Observations 734 734 714 738 738 736 
R-squared 3.84% 3.94% 4.54% 4.05% 3.92% 4.14% 
Panel C: Dependent Variable is LnQ3 
Constant -0.140* -0.086 -0.088 -0.138 -0.102 -0.117 
 
(-1.67) (-1.04) (-1.05) (-1.60) (-1.22) (-1.41) 
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Hedging 
dummy 
-0.143*** 
  
-0.048 
  
 
(-2.92) 
  
(-0.95) 
  
DeltaPro 
 
-0.074 
  
0.103 
 
 
 
(-0.90) 
  
(1.25) 
 
DeltaRes 
  
-0.429 
  
0.469 
 
  
(-0.60) 
  
(0.61) 
Observations 734 734 714 738 738 736 
R-squared 9.38% 8.41% 8.92% 9.04% 9.12% 9.04% 
 
  
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
Table 6: Hedging and Firm Value Conditioned on the Direction of Commodity 
Price Movement 
This table presents the results of the pooled cross-sectional time-series least squares regression on the 
impact of hedging on firm value, conditioned on the annual direction of the movement in oil and gas 
prices. The models are presented as Equations (9), (10) and (11) in the main text. The 
reporting of control variables is suppressed to conserve space. The dependent 
variables are measured by the natural log of Q1, Q2, and Q3. The sample includes 94 
oil/gas firms from 1998 to 2009, or a total of 840 firm-year observations.   is the 
dummy variable equaling 1 if the annual return of oil/gas is positive during year I and 0 
otherwise. Other variables remain the same as described above. t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. *,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. For brevity, the coefficients relating to the constant and control variables 
are not reported. 
 
Oil   Gas 
  1    2             3           1           2     3 
Panel A: Dependent Variable is LnQ1 
Constant 0.453*** 0.493*** 0.555*** 
 
0.439*** 0.511*** 0.512*** 
 
(5.91) (6.71) (7.61) 
 
(5.44) (6.60) (6.73) 
Hedging*DU -0.199*** -0.363*** -2.843*** 
 
-0.205*** -0.271*** -2.346*** 
 
(-3.67) (-3.62) (-3.36) 
 
(-3.93) (-2.85) (-2.80) 
Hedging*(1-DU) -0.019 -0.080 -1.062 
 
-0.054 -0.051 -0.934 
 
(-0.33) (-0.85) (-1.27) 
 
(-0.85) (-0.49) (-0.90) 
DU 0.023 -0.014 -0.022 
 
0.082 0.037 0.026 
 
(0.46) (-0.32) (-0.53)   (1.54) (0.80) (0.57) 
R-squared 10.96% 10.95% 11.70% 
 
10.62% 9.74% 9.54% 
Panel B: Dependent Variable is LnQ2 
Constant -0.559*** -0.561*** -0.484*** 
 
0.595*** -0.566*** -0.536** 
 
(-5.92) (-6.21) (-5.25) 
 
(-5.97) (-5.96) (-5.67) 
Hedging*DU -0.101 -0.343*** 0.372 
 
-0.143** -0.304** -0.506 
 
(-1.51) (-2.78) (0.35) 
 
(-2.23) (-2.61) (-0.49) 
Hedging*(1-DU) 0.055 0.113 2.783** 
 
0.094 0.209 3.466** 
 
(0.77) (0.97) (2.64) 
 
(1.20) (1.63) (2.68) 
DU -0.198*** -0.193*** -0.223*** 
 
-0.129* -0.156*** -0.172*** 
 
(-3.29) (-3.67) (-4.28) 
 
(-1.96) (-2.74) (-3.07) 
R-squared 8.55% 9.27% 9.05% 
 
8.49% 8.77% 8.41% 
Panel C: Dependent Variable is LnQ3 
Constant -0.148* -0.088 -0.081 
 
-0.163 -0.112 -0.109 
 
(-1.69) (-1.04) (-0.95) 
 
(-1.76) (-1.26) (-1.24) 
Hedging*DU -0.230*** -0.345*** -2.186** 
 
-0.138** -0.109 -0.843 
 
(-3.68) (-2.99) (-2.20) 
 
(-2.31) (-1.00) (-0.87) 
Hedging*(1-DU) -0.033 0.171 1.367 
 
0.101 0.337*** 2.341* 
 
(-0.50) (1.57) (1.39) 
 
(1.39) (2.82) (1.95) 
DU 0.007 0.000 -0.021 
 
0.049 0.017 -0.011 
 
(0.12) (-0.01) (-0.44) 
 
(0.80) (0.31) (-0.20) 
R-squared 10.48% 10.29% 10.20% 
 
10.35% 10.41% 9.92% 
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Table 7: Value of Hedging using Fama-French Three-factor Model Alpha 
 
This table presents the results from testing the hedging premium using the Fama-French three-factor 
model. The models relevant to Panels A and B, respectively, are: 
                                                     
(  ) 
                                                                     
(18) 
where           is the return in month t of a portfolio comprising of hedgers and              is the 
return in month t of a portfolio comprising of non-hedgers. The portfolio weights are based on the 
percentage of the production hedged for the hedger portfolio and equal weights for the non-hedger 
portfolio.      is the market return and      is the risk free rate.  SMBt is the difference between the 
returns on a portfolio of small stocks and a portfolio of big stocks. HMLt is the difference between the 
returns on a portfolio of high book-to-market ratio stocks and a portfolio of low book-to-market 
stocks. Market return, risk free rate, SMB and HML data are collected from the Kenneth French 
website.      and        are dummy variables equaling 1 if  the crude oil/natural gas price increases or 
decreases, respectively, and is 0 otherwise. For brevity, the table reports the alpha coefficient estimates 
only. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Baseline Results 
 
Alpha Estimate t-value 
Oil_Hedger - Oil_NonHedger -0.980* (-1.66) 
Gas_Hedger - Gas_NonHedger -1.172** (-2.07) 
Panel B: Hedging Premium with Price Increase/Decrease  
Oil_Hedger - Oil_NonHedger (Up) -2.001** (-2.47) 
Oil_Hedger - Oil_NonHedger (Down) 0.144 (0.17) 
Gas_Hedger - Gas_NonHedger  (Up) -1.929*** (-2.66) 
Gas_Hedger - Gas_NonHedger (Down) 0.034 (-0.04) 
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Table 8: Value of Hedging using Fama-French Three-factor Model Alpha 
Conditioned on Price Level Effect 
This table presents the results from testing the hedging premium using the Fama-French three-factor 
model. The models relevant to Panels A and B, respectively, are: 
 
                                                                      
(19) 
                                                                                 
                                        (20) 
where           is the return in month t of a portfolio comprising of hedgers and              is the 
return in month t of a portfolio comprising of non-hedgers. The portfolio weights are based on the 
percentage of the production hedged for the hedger portfolio and equal weights for the non-hedger 
portfolio.      is the market return and      is the risk free rate.  SMBt is the difference between the 
returns on a portfolio of small stocks and a portfolio of big stocks. HMLt is the difference between the 
returns on a portfolio of high book-to-market ratio stocks and a portfolio of low book-to-market stocks. 
Market return, risk free rate, SMB and HML data are collected from the Kenneth French website.       = 
1 if oil/gas price is greater than sample median or 0 otherwise and       = 1 if oil/gas price is less than 
sample median or 0otherwise.       and        are dummy variables equaling 1 if  the crude oil/natural 
gas price increases or decreases, respectively. For brevity, the table reports the alpha coefficient 
estimates only. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
Panel A: Hedging Alpha Conditioned on Price Level Effect 
 
Alpha Estimate t-value 
Oil_Hedger - Oil_NonHedger (High) -1.043 (-1.28) 
Oil_Hedger - Oil_NonHedger (Low) -0.912 (-1.07) 
Gas_Hedger - Gas_NonHedger  (High) -0.736 (-0.89) 
Gas_Hedger - Gas_NonHedger (Low) -1.559** (-2.01) 
Panel B: Hedging Alpha Conditioned on Price Level Effect with Price Increase/Decrease  
Oil_Hedger - Oil_NonHedger (High*Up) -2.483** (-2.24) 
Oil_Hedger - Oil_NonHedger (Low*Up) -1.487 (-1.29) 
Oil_Hedger - Oil_NonHedger (High*Down) 0.602 (0.51) 
Oil_Hedger - Oil_NonHedger (Low*Down) -0.339 (-0.28) 
Gas_Hedger - Gas_NonHedger (High*Up) -2.176** (-2.05) 
Gas_Hedger - Gas_NonHedger (Low*Up) -1.757* (-1.83) 
Gas_Hedger - Gas_NonHedger (High*Down) 1.395 (1.07) 
Gas_Hedger - Gas_NonHedger (Low*Down) -1.321 (-1.02) 
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Table 9: Value of Hedging using Fama-French Three-Factor Model Alpha 
Conditioned on Implied Volatility 
This table presents the results for testing the hedging premium using the Fama-French three-factor 
model. The models relevant to Panels A and B, respectively, are: 
 
                                                                         
(21) 
                                                                   
(22) 
where           is the return in month t of a portfolio comprising of hedgers and              is the 
return in month t of a portfolio comprising of non-hedgers. The portfolio weights are based on the 
percentage of the production hedged for the hedger portfolio and equal weights for the non-hedger 
portfolio.      is the market return and      is the risk free rate.  SMBt is the difference between the 
returns on a portfolio of small stocks and a portfolio of big stocks. HMLt is the difference between the 
returns on a portfolio of high book-to-market ratio stocks and a portfolio of low book-to-market stocks. 
Market return, risk free rate, SMB and HML data are collected from the Kenneth French website.           
= 1 if oil/gas implied volatility is greater than sample median or 0 otherwise and         = 1 if oil/gas 
price implied volatility is less than sample median or 0 otherwise. The implied volatility is calculated from 
one year options on oil and natural gas futures contracts that are traded on the New York Mercantile 
Exchange. For brevity, the table reports the alpha coefficient estimates only.  t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
Panel A:  Hedging Alpha Conditioned on Implied Volatility      
 
Alpha Estimate t-value 
Oil_Hedger - Oil_NonHedger (High) -1.195 (-1.37) 
Oil_Hedger - Oil_NonHedger (Low) -0.806 (-1.02) 
Gas_Hedger - Gas_NonHedger  (High) -0.642 (-0.82) 
Gas_Hedger - Gas_NonHedger (Low) -1.769** (-2.13) 
Panel B:  Hedging Alpha Conditioned on Changes in Implied Volatility   
Constant_Oil -0.965 (-1.62) 
IV_Oil 0.018 (0.22) 
Constant_Gas -1.223** (-2.11) 
IV_Gas 0.051 (0.47) 
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Table 10: Robustness Check of Hedging and Firm Value — 2SLS approach 
 
This table reports the results relating to the effect of hedging activities on firm value using 2SLS. The 
models are given as Equations (6), (7) and (8) in the main text. The three alternative dependent variables 
are measured by the natural log of Q1, Q2, and Q3. The sample includes 94 firms from 2005 to 2009, or a 
total of 470 firm-year observations. The variable HedDum is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the company 
hedges; DeltaPro is delta production and is calculated as the ratio of total value of hedges to production; 
and delta reserves (DeltaRes) is the ratio of total value of hedges to reserves. The control variables are as 
follows: log (assets) is the log of BV of total assets; ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets; 
Investment growth is the ratio of capital expenditure over total assets; Leverage is the BV of long-term 
debt over MV of common equity; Payout dummy equals 1 if the firm has some form of payout via either 
dividends or share repurchases in the current year; and Production cost is the dollar cost per barrel of oil 
equivalent. Reporting of control variables is suppressed to conserve space. The instrumental variables 
are: lagged HedDum, percentage of Directors with an accounting background and percentage of CEO 
compensation in cash. The first two rows in each panel present the coefficients and t-statistics of the 
hedging variables. The null hypothesis of the Sargan test is that the IVs are exogenous, i.e. they are 
uncorrelated to some set of residuals. The null hypothesis of the Hausman test is that the hedging variable 
is exogenous. The p-values for the Sargan and Hausman tests are reported in the third and fourth columns 
of each panel. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  Oil     Gas 
  HedDum DeltaPro DeltaRes   HedDum DeltaPro DeltaRes 
Panel A: Dependent Variable is LnQ1 
Coefficient -0.107 -0.210 -3.154 
 
-0.191* -0.351 -4.279* 
t-value (-1.14) (-1.07) (-1.45) 
 
(-1.65) (-1.49) (-1.69) 
Sargan test 0.75 0.698 0.625 
 
0.662 0.548 0.773 
Hausman test 0.804 0.566 0.312   0.79 0.334 0.226 
Panel B: Dependent Variable is LnQ2 
Coefficient 0.074 -0.050 2.447 
 
0.083 0.169 2.238 
t-value (0.13) (-0.06) (0.29) 
 
(0.52) (0.53) (0.66) 
Sargan test 0.879 0.873 0.738 
 
0.775 0.776 0.834 
Hausman test 0.978 0.938 0.995   0.723 0.902 0.602 
Panel C: Dependent Variable is LnQ3 
Coefficient 0.052 0.138 0.927 
 
0.202 0.384 3.661 
t-value (0.50) (0.65) (0.38) 
 
(1.59) (1.53) (1.35) 
Sargan test 0.579 0.624 0.707 
 
0.626 0.545 0.442 
Hausman test 0.219 0.832 0.853 
 
0.303 0.586 0.399 
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Uncovering the asymmetric linkage between financial derivatives 
and firm value – the case of oil and gas exploration and 
production companies 
 
Highlights 
 We explore the value enhancing role of hedging in a sample of oil and gas companies 
 The value of hedging depends on the movement of oil and gas prices 
 Hedging is related to lower firm market value when oil and gas prices increase 
 Hedger portfolios in general underperform non-hedger portfolios 
